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      The Honorable Joseph H. Rodriguez, Senior District Judge, United States District1
Court for the District of New Jersey, sitting by designation.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
                    
RODRIGUEZ, District Judge.
The Estate of William J. Neff, by and through the Administrator of his Estate,
Joyce A. Landauer, appeals from the District Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order
3denying Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granting the Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment on the underlying declaratory judgment action.  The Complaint
alleged that Neff died as the result of injuries sustained while in the care of an Alterra
Healthcare assisted living facility insured by the Appellees, and sought a declaration of
coverage.  For the reasons below, we will affirm the District Court’s entry of summary
judgment.
I.
Because we write solely for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and
procedural history of the case, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our analysis. 
Alterra Healthcare Corporation owned, operated, controlled, and managed a personal care
home in Bucks County, Pennsylvania where William J. Neff was a patient.  In September
of 2000, Mr. Neff was badly injured while in the care of Alterra employee Heidi Tenzer. 
During the next several days, three other Alterra employees, Patricia Policino, Anne
McClintock, and Linda Murray, became aware of Mr. Neff’s injuries but did not render
treatment or report his condition to his family or his doctor.  Mr. Neff died approximately
one week after he was injured.  As the result of an investigation initiated by the coroner’s
office, Ms. Tenzer was convicted of criminal charges.  The three other Alterra employees
pled guilty to neglect of a care dependent person, a misdemeanor.  The question before
the District Court was whether Alterra’s primary liability insurance policy provided
through Liberty Surplus Insurance and/or the first excess insurance policy provided
       The exclusion also precludes coverage for claims of negligent employment,2
investigation, supervision, “reporting to the proper authorities, or failure to so report,” or
retention “of a person . . . whose conduct would be excluded by” the above-quoted
language.  (A-172.)  Appellant concedes that this clause applies to negate any of the
Alterra employees’ claims of coverage in defending negligent employment, supervision,
or reporting causes of action.  It appears that the District Court relied on this clause in
finding that the employees were “not insured for their neglectful actions.”  (A-9.)
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through American Empire Surplus Lines Insurance cover the personal injury claims Neff
filed against Alterra and its four employees (the “Alterra defendants”).
The District Court found that the policies at issue contained the following
exclusionary language: “This insurance does not apply to ‘bodily injury,’ ‘property
damage’ or ‘personal and advertising injury’ arising out of . . . [t]he actual or threatened
abuse or molestation by anyone of any person while in the care, custody or control of any
insured.”  (A-172.)   The Court determined that the “abuse or molestation exclusion”2
precluded coverage in the Neff case, regardless of whether the laws of Pennsylvania,
Wisconsin, or Massachusetts applied because this was a case of false conflict.  Because a
conflict of laws issue was raised, however, the District Court, in an abundance of caution,
performed a choice of law analysis and determined that Pennsylvania law would apply,
and clearly would give effect to the abuse or molestation exclusion to preclude coverage. 
Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment.
II.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and review a
district court’s entry of summary judgment de novo.  Pennsylvania Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt,
563 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 1995).  “[T]he interpretation of the scope of coverage of an
insurance contract is a question of law properly decided by the court, a question over
which [this court] exercise[s] plenary review.”  Medical Protective Co. v. Watkins, 198
F.3d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
Under Pennsylvania law, which Appellant acknowledges applies in construing
insurance policy language, an insurance company is obligated to defend an insured when
the complaint filed by the injured party may potentially come within the policy’s
coverage.  Pacific Indem. Co. v. Linn, 766 F.2d 754, 760 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing
Pennsylvania cases).  In construing an insurance policy, the court must give unambiguous
terms their “plain and ordinary meaning.”  St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 935
F.2d 1428, 1431 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass’n Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Ins. Co., 233 A.2d 548, 551 (Pa. 1967)).  On the other hand, terms in an insurance
contract which are ambiguous are to be construed strictly against the insurer and in favor
of the insured.  Id. (citing Mohn v. American Cas. Co., 326 A.2d 346, 351 (Pa. 1974)).
III.
The District Court correctly found that the terms and conditions of the insurance
policies preclude coverage for the claims against the Alterra defendants.  The Liberty
Surplus commercial general liability policy excludes coverage for claims of injury
“arising out of . . . [t]he actual or threatened abuse or molestation by anyone of any person
while in the care, custody or control of any insured.”  (A-172.)  While Appellant concedes
       “[T]his insurance applies . . . [s]eparately to each insured against whom claim is3
made or ‘suit’ is brought.”  (A-125.)
       Appellant does not argue that the injuries did not arise out of the abuse of Mr. Neff4
by Tenzer.
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that this provision would preclude coverage under the laws of all three states considered,
it argues that reading the “separation of insureds” provision  in connection with the abuse3
or molestation exclusion creates an ambiguity in the policy obligating the Appellees to
provide coverage in the Neff personal injury lawsuit with respect to the claims against the
Alterra defendants other than Tenzer.  This Court disagrees.  
The plain and ordinary meaning of the exclusion is that there is no coverage if a
plaintiff’s injury arises out of abuse or molestation.   The abuse or molestation does not4
have to have been committed by “the insured” or even “an insured,” but by “anyone.” 
Invoking the separation of insureds provision does not narrow the broad reach of the
exclusion.  The abuse or molestation exclusion precludes coverage for the claims as to
each of the four Alterra employees and Alterra, and would do so even if each is sued
separately.
The suggestion that Massachusetts law creates an ambiguity is not persuasive. 
Massachusetts law does not create an ambiguity in the contract language here.  In 1986,
the Massachusetts Supreme Court gave effect to a severability of insurance provision to
conclude that an automobile exclusion in a homeowner’s insurance policy precluded
coverage for personal injury claims caused by the drunk driving of the homeowners’ son,
7but did not preclude coverage for a claim against the homeowners for negligent
supervision of their son.  Worchester Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marnell, 496 N.E.2d 158 (Mass.
1986).  In the Massachusetts case, coverage did not apply to bodily injury arising out of
the ownership or use of a vehicle owned or operated by any insured.  The court reasoned
that the claim of negligent supervision in the home by the homeowner parents was
“separate and distinct from use or operation of an automobile” by the homeowners’
intoxicated son, and so it did not arise out of such use excluded by the policy.  Id.  More
recent Massachusetts case law apparently has characterized Marnell as applying only
where homeowner’s and automobile insurance are in conflict.  See, e.g., Hingham Mut.
Fire Ins. Co. v. Smith, 865 N.E.2d 1168 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (“the result in Marnell
turned on the allocation of risks between homeowner’s coverage and automobile liability
insurance”); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Churchwell, 785 N.E.2d 392, 395 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003)
(determinative factor in deciding coverage in Marnell was the allocation of risks between
an insured's homeowner's policy and automobile insurance).  Marnell is inapplicable here,
and there is no conflict of laws to be resolved.  
The severability clause in this case simply does not affect the applicability of the
exclusion for bodily injuries arising out of abuse or molestation.  There is no duty to
defend or indemnify the Alterra defendants under the terms and conditions of the policies
at issue with respect to the injuries sustained by Mr. Neff.
8V.
Accordingly, we will affirm the Order of the District Court denying summary
judgment for Appellant and granting summary judgment in favor of the Appellees.
